Introduction

32
In recent decades, the concept of ecosystem services (ES) has gained widespread attention as 33 one fruitful approach for integrating into decision-making ecosystem-related values often 34 3 heretofore dismissed as externalities. As the provision of direct and indirect benefits to people 35 from ecosystems (building upon Daily, 1997; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005) , ES as a 36 framework has provided an approach to bridge the gap between ecology and economics, and 37 thus the approach to date primarily represents these two perspectives. Specifically, economic 38 valuation techniques are used to assign a value to ecosystem components and functions (see 39 is transformative values, the value of a thing for the way it changes how we think (Norton, 204 1987) . A person cannot sum up the importance of a story to her with a number, and she often 205 cannot relate the relevance of the story for a given problem without telling the story. This 206 recognition of the importance of experience has motivated many scientists to turn to literature 207 in their attempt to express the values they derive from nature (Satterfield and Slovic, 2004) , and 208 narration itself can help lay people articulate a broad range of environmental values (Satterfield, 209 2001) . If there are important transformative values associated with a site, associated narratives 210 generally need to be told and heard in order for the values to be appreciated, as the 211 transformation is personal. 212
In addition to the problems posed by the above three kinds of incommensurability, the 213 incorporation of cultural services into an ES framework is confounded by the frequent conflation 214 of values, benefits, and services-which in this context must be distinguished for two reasons 215 (discussed in Chan et al., 2011) . Benefits, as valued goods and experiences, are the level at 216 which people can most easily relate ecosystems to themselves. Services, as the ecosystem 217 processes underpinning benefits, are the level at which ecosystem properties and dynamics 218 might be considered in planning and management. Values are the preferences, principles and 219 virtues that we (up)hold as individuals or groups. Unlike the categorization of services and 220
benefits, values can differ in kind across any of eight (or more) dimensions, with ramifications 221 for appropriate valuation. 222 11 223
Dimensions of Values for Environmental Decision-Making
224
The broad term "value" can refer to both underlying ideals (held values, such as bravery, 225 fairness, happiness) and also the relative importance of things (assigned values, such as 226 monetary values of goods) (Brown, 1984) . As others have argued persuasively, empirical 227 valuations can only be explained by recognizing disjunctions between valuation methods 228 employed and the respective kinds of value at play (Brown, 1984; Lockwood, 1998; Sagoff, 229 1998 individual preference but an index of support for a morally right or just society (Sagoff, 1998) . 236
The dollar metric "index" can thus be insensitive to scale because survey participants find the 237 question inappropriate, or they do not distinguish scope and so, for example, the dollar amount 238 promised for one improvement is the same as that for five. The dollar amount provided is 239 thereby a proxy for a donation to the social good and not an expression of market value per se. 240
In order to inform management and policy, we consider together all manner of personal and 241 moral notions that contribute to a person"s judgment of right and wrong, but we distinguish 242 those dimensions especially pertinent for considering appropriate venues for value expression 243
and decision-making. Not all values pertain to the importance of benefits from ES, but all are 244 important to the broader context of environmental decision-making. Note that we consider 245 values to be one way to understand and represent what matters to people, and not a set of 246 entities that exist "out there". Accordingly, while the typology below caricatures binaries (or 247 triads) across the eight dimensions of value, we recognize that any instantiation of value-e.g., 248 a person"s motivation for conservation-will be a complex mixture of value-types and not cleanly 249 just one part of any binary (e.g., not just for oneself or others, but both intertwined). For 250 philosophers, representing such disparate notions on the same spectrum risks conflating 251 fundamentally unlike things, whereas for most people such distinctions are semantic 252 constructions resulting from ad hoc dissection of a single set of judgments. Our pragmatic 253 approach involves walking a purposeful middle road between these two perspectives in order to 254 inform research for practice. 255
Preferences vs. principles vs. virtues
256
One dimension of value follows a division of ethical theories between principle-based 257 (deontological) and preference-based (teleological/consequentialist) (March, 1994; Sagoff, 1996 Sagoff, , 258 1998 Sagoff, , 2000 Spash, 2000) , to which we recognize a third category of virtue-based values (Dean 259 Under some circumstances, a person"s preferences may be affected by her principles or virtues 263 (ideas of right actions or right people), and the principles a person adopts and maintains may 264 stem partly from her virtues: the kind of person we believe we should be (e.g., honest) can 265 inform the kinds of principles we uphold (e.g., truth-telling), which can affect how much we 266 desire a thing (e.g., a product marketed dishonestly). This relationship between preferences and 267 principles has implications for resulting valuations: one should expect frequent non-additivity, 268 non-transitivity, and rapid changes in preferences including willingness to pay (WTP). Furthermore, although principles and virtues generally do not pertain directly to the products of 276 ecosystem services (rather, indirectly through preferences), they may be critical to the success 277 or failure of plans or projects. For example, principle-and virtue-based values may be at the 278 heart of many of the problematic kinds of incommensurability discussed above. Accordingly, 279 environmental researchers and decision-makers ignore principles and virtues at their peril. 280
Market-mediated vs. non-market-mediated
281
Another fundamental distinction is between values mediated through the market (in most cases, 282 through money) and those that are independent of markets. Our market/non-market value 283 dichotomy differs from the market/non-market valuation dichotomy of economics. In economics, 284 valuation of a good/service is "non-market" if the good/service is not directly transacted in 285 markets, even if valuation relies upon the thing"s contributions to market-transacted 286 goods/services; all revealed-preference methods operate this way (e.g., hedonic valuation, 287 travel-cost method). By our terminology, such revealed-preference "non-market" valuation would 288 provide measures of supporting/instrumental market-mediated value: at stake, but indirectly, is 289 a gain/loss of money (see 2.6 Supporting vs. final (instrumental vs. inherent)). Money has a 290 particular kind of meaning because its value is independent of the things bought/sold. Second, benefits mediated through markets with middle-men are almost certain to be thought 296 of-and valued-in largely instrumental terms. As a thing becomes such a commodity, the 297 special (sometimes unique) value of the thing based on its embodied labour and meaning, 298 meaning associated with the transaction itself, etc., may be lost. Consider the kinds of values 299 that tend to accompany things made and gifted by the producer at one extreme, through things 300 sold by the producer (e.g., at a farmers" or craft market), to those sold in major retail chains. 301
The value of the latter market-mediated things is more likely to be represented well by 302 monetary values alone (monetary values are more likely to be an appropriate estimate of a 303 thing"s true value to a person). 304
The nature of a particular good or service can change fundamentally depending on whether it 305 could be traded in markets-even if the particular item is not traded-as exemplified by West 306 (2006) in her discussion of Papua New Guinean net-bags. These net-bags were once key objects 307 of social exchange in the form of hand-made expressions of love, reciprocity, etc. When they 308 instead became commodities for sale in markets, unexpected social consequences followed. 309
Women (the producers) became viewed as labour inputs in production; this in turn triggered 310 increases in bride prices and the expectation that net-bags could and should be produced more 311 quickly. The value of both ("women" and "bags") was thus altered greatly, with consequences for 312 social interactions. 313
Self-oriented vs. other-oriented
314
It is important to distinguish between concern for oneself vs. for others, as this raises an 315 important question of constituency ("the individual or group that the valuator is representing 316 when making the valuation"). Valuation should represent all who have a legitimate stake in the 317 resulting decision; and economists generally prefer self-oriented valuation by each legitimate 318 stakeholder to other-oriented valuation. The unfortunate byproduct of such practice is that the 319 perspectives of some who cannot express valuations are largely ignored (including future people 320 and non-human organisms). Future people generally are assumed to have the same preferences 321 as existing people: although important differences are likely, they cannot easily be anticipated. 322
In contrast, non-human organisms frequently are assumed to be of no intrinsic moral worth (so 323 not deserving consideration), an assumption that many-including Chan (2011) 
Experiential vs. metaphysical
337
Objects can be valued not only for contributions to valued experiences, but also-simultaneously 338 and sometimes inseparably-for their existence, independent of experience (Krutilla, 1967) . The 339 classic existence value is the expressed preference of donors to conservation organizations, who 340 seek to protect wildlife or patches of wilderness without any expectation of future experience 341 (Krutilla, 1967) . Such metaphysical values can be self-oriented (existence value) or other-342
oriented (e.g., bequest value), and they can be based in virtues, principles, or preferences. 343
Attention to this dimension of value can help resolve appropriate constituencies of valuation: 344 because of the experience requirement, experiential values generally incur much narrower 345 constituencies than metaphysical ones (only people who visit a park will benefit from 346 experiential enjoyment, but many might benefit metaphysically). 347
Supporting vs. final (instrumental vs. inherent)
348
Some values of things stem from the manner in which they help to produce other things; other 349 values are inherent in that they are desired ends in themselves. The former are supporting or 350 instrumental values, while the latter are final/terminal or inherent values (Brown, 1984 represented by monetary valuations), particularly for "environmental amenities" such as clean air 374 or water (Gregory et al., 1993) . To the extent that powerful experiences can change the way we 375 view the world and designate importance (many environmental leaders cite the power of such 376 pivotal experiences in motivating their own paths- Mowat, 1990 dimensions. This may be for two reasons. First, a service may be intimately connected to a non-397 material benefit (e.g., because benefiting materially from a market good requires that someone 398 obtain that good, which generally entails employment, physical activity, and/or other non-399 material benefits). Second, even material benefits may relate to various kinds of values (e.g., 400
produce from a farmers" market-a market good-may be connected to inspiration, social capital 401 and cohesion, and other categories of benefits, such that individual self-oriented monetary 402 valuation may incompletely represent value to people) ( Figure 1 ). This is in contrast to 403 conventional economic approaches to ES, where it is often desirable to compartmentalize 404 services such that each service only provides one kind of benefit (Kareiva et al., 2011)-a 405 simplification that will be enlightening in some contexts and obfuscating in others. 406 
The ubiquitous need to consider intangible dimensions
407 Without considering intangible dimensions, management or policy actions that might seem 408 highly desirable for a natural resource may actually hide aspects that suggest a more
Non-Use and Cultural Values as Ecosystem Services
449
In our proposed typology, many services produce multiple benefits, and the value of a service 450 depends on the marginal value of changes in the various benefits it provides. Each of the 451 associated benefits might simultaneously change through various other processes, which 452 renders the independent valuation of several services problematic. all such values-including the sacred-are for sale (Spash, 2008b) . Anthropologists, sociologists, 478 ethicists, etc., endeavour to represent a fuller set of values, even if that representation is a site-479 specific description that cannot be generalized. Although adopting approaches from these other 480 schools will make analysis "messier" and less generalizable, it is a necessary route to a decision-481 making framework comprehensive in values (Figure 2) . 482
Implications for ES Research
Of course an ES analysis will rarely if ever determine any particular decision alone, so a worthy 483 question is whether ES researchers should bother seeking a comprehensive analytical 484 framework that includes ill-fitting values. One might instead assume that political processes will 485 ensure that such values will be properly considered in decision-making, as through a systematic 486 democratic process or small-"p" politics (the ubiquitous jockeying to achieve goals through social 487 power and influence). While understandable, we posit that such an approach yields four risks: 488
(1) the attractiveness of a pre-packaged (e.g., cost-benefit) analysis might lead to important 489 values being left out entirely; (2) although such values might be reflected in decision-making, 490 political processes may be too blunt an instrument to represent the role of social and ecological 491 dynamics in these co-produced benefits of cultural ES; (3) the ad hoc political process might 492 privilege the interests of those who are empowered politically, socially, and economically, at the 493 expense of the interests of the disempowered; (4) the inability to reconcile a technical "black-494 23 box" analysis with deeply-held values might incite constituents to reject the analysis, and along 495 with it all the important research on ecological processes and functional relationships. 496
We do not intend that ES research should disentangle all possible service-benefit-value 497 connections and employ a valuation exercise suited for each. Such reductionism would be 498 impossibly and unnecessarily complicated. Rather, the conceptual mapping of services to 499 benefits to values is helpful for researchers to identify interdependencies between services, 500 potential double-counting, and broad valuation strategies that can appropriately account for the 501 relevant diversity of values. 502
What matters most are the following key points: (1) ecosystems provide a variety of benefits 503 through services, which are subject to management; (2) many services provide several benefits, 504
such that interdependencies between services should be expected and accounted for; (3) people 505 are likely to have a variety of preferences, principles, and virtues that pertain to ES, benefits, 506
and their management-and these values are likely to be complex and diverse across several 507 dimensions that have ramifications for valuation. 508 The prevailing economic perspective on ecosystem services is represented in Figure 2 . According 526 to this perspective, the quantification of ecosystem services requires a metric of service 527 provision that is the product of an "ecological production function" and the input to an "economic 528 valuation function". For any intangible, non-market-mediated service or benefit (including 529 recreation, subsistence, education & research, artistic, and "ceremonial" services, and 530 place/heritage, spiritual, inspiration, held, and identity value) it will be difficult to identify a priori 531 metrics of service-or benefit provision. E.g., we can measure pollination as a service in the form 532 of fruit set, and size and quality of fruit (Ricketts et al., 2004) , but what metric could possibly 533 represent the ecosystem provision of identity value? The problem is not that there can be no 534 intermediary between ecosystems and the resulting values-there can. Rather, for benefits not 535 mediated through markets, the characteristics that constitute the quantity and quality of benefit 536 are not amenable to generalization and must be discovered on site. In contrast, for market-537 mediated goods one can appeal to characteristics of the global markets to identify appropriate 538 metrics of service/benefit provision. 539
Conceptual (ES typologies and conceptual frameworks)
Ecosystems produce benefits through services, and those benefits matter to people and 540 decision-making in many ways insufficiently represented by monetary valuation. Principles and 541 25 virtues, for example, pertain to many aspects of decision-making, in ways too important to be 542 overlooked or distorted. The current popularity of the concept of sustainability is a prime 543 example: that we should govern our resources in a manner that does not compromise "the 544 ability of future generations to meet their own needs … in particular the essential needs of the 545 world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given" (WCED, 1987, p.43) . Accordingly, 546 sustainability is an idea steeped in principles of intergenerational equity and basic human needs. 547
For ES research to ignore principles and virtues at the valuation stage would be to advance a 548 dismembered concept of value lacking much of what matters to people. 549
Finally, even though biocentric values are not considered to be measures of benefits for people, 550 it is crucial that ES valuation provide space for their expression in a manner commensurate with 551 anthropocentric values. Some argue persuasively that it is unjustifiably speciesist for our duties 552 to non-human organisms to be represented only through the extent to which people feel better 553 or worse (Singer, 1993) . Moreover, it will often be difficult to elicit from people only the parts of 554 their values that correspond to their personal satisfaction, without the parts that stem from the 555 moral commitments underlying or paralleling that satisfaction. 556
Methodological (to assist decision-making)
557
If, following the above, we accept that ecosystem services provide multiple benefits, valued for 558 a range of reasons, then we must employ valuation methods that better match the diversity of 559 values in question. An individual"s values can be assessed using individual preference methods, 560 but group/holistic methods are better assessed using group or deliberative approaches (e.g., 561
Gregory et al. group-deliberative processes for deriving and assigning value (Keeney and Gregory, 2005) . 585
While too comprehensive a topic for full coverage in this paper, we generally advocate a multi-586 method and especially multi-metric approach. Likely key to this will be ability to either infer 587 weights or preferences through choice surveys based on paired comparisons (Chuenpagdee et understand as) awe is more important than another value because the option that emphasizes 594 protecting that kind of experience is preferred across many choices or paired comparisons. 595
In the case of creating a metric for less tangible values using a multi-metric "constructed" 596 approach, the goal is best served by flexibility in the scales used (Keeney and Gregory, 2005) . exist. An example might be a scale to measure the ES benefit that maintaining a species used 617 only for local (e.g., indigenous or First Nation-to-First Nation) trading, such as dried edible 618 seaweeds, a coveted food and widely used for ceremonial purposes across the BC coast (Turner 619
and Loewen, 1998). Impact in the face of harm, may affect provisioning or market value, but 620 also the cultural value placed on "enduring trading relationships" or "ceremonial or cultural" use. 621
That is, a scale would then be developed for the value of relationships across communities that 622 might be harmed if trading is not maintained. In a situation such as this, an index might be 623 created spanning 1-5, with 1 = "complete loss of local trading partner/relations", ranging 624 through 5 = "no loss of trading partner/relations", or similar for effect on ceremonial practices. 625
Such a constructed index can focus a decision maker"s attention on tradeoffs with other 626 attributes and questions such as "is it worth protecting against potential impact on seaweed for 627 x years in order to increase protection (e.g., of trading relations or networks) from level 2 to as discussed above; and full realization of the potential of deliberative decision-making requires 643 a rare set of circumstances (e.g., a wise, beneficent decision maker; a political context that 644 provides a viable opportunity for decision-making outside the predominant neoliberal economic 645 framework; all relevant stakeholders possessing a meaningful say at a table where they can 646 communicate their concerns and needs effectively in a political process; etc.). Despite these 647 limitations, we see a tremendous opportunity for ES characterization and deliberative decision-648 making to co-produce decision-making that reflects a richer understanding of the myriad ways 649 that ecosystem change matters to people. Similar developments in the health risk literature also 650 offer a case in point from which ES scholars might draw (Renn, 1999) . call for stories to be told in the decision-making process, how can these critically important 685 narratives and value expressions be brought forth, and for whom? To the extent that ES 686 decision-making may require input from group valuation workshops, what are the ramifications 687 of differences in group composition, and how should groups be chosen for participation? 688
Addressing each of these research frontiers will require collaborations involving a diverse range 689 of natural and social scientists, practitioners, policy makers, and other stakeholders. We hope 690 that this paper will start a conversation about how to do so most appropriately. 
